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Abstract
We are witnessing a revolution in the way we get around, if
only we glance up from our phones. “Techies” and suit-clad
professionals alike use their phones to request rides from tuxedoattired professional chauffeurs in luxury vehicles, as well as from
part-time nonprofessionals using their “daily-driver” to make some
extra cash. It is indisputable that Transportation Network
Companies (TNCs)—like Uber and Lyft—are providing unique
alternatives to taxis and conventional charter-car carriers while
simultaneously paving the way for a new era in transportation.
“App-based” car-for-hire platforms, said to be the cause of
market “disruption,” have met unwavering resistance from
industry competitors, advocacy groups, and government regulators
arguing that these services are illegal, unsafe, and competing
unfairly. Consequently, TNCs have often faced outright bans,
anachronistic regulations, and numerous legal hurdles. Whether
the rationales for regulations and bans have been pretexts for
protectionism and resistance to change, or legitimate expressions
* Candidate for J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, May
2016. I would like to thank Professors Kish Parella and Joshua A.T. Fairfield for
their invaluable guidance throughout the drafting of this piece. Thank you to
the Washington and Lee Law Review editorial boards for their insightful
suggestions and thoughtful edits. I would also like to thank my family and
friends for their love and support in all my endeavors.
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of concern for safety and fair business practices, it is clear that
they are responses to TNCs supplying a demand for easy,
affordable, and reliable transportation.
This Note examines whether the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine bars certain types of bans or regulations of TNC
platforms. Though TNCs have not shown an eagerness to litigate
challenges to their operations, this avenue of defense—a road once
treaded by trucking and railroad companies—remains open to
them. TNCs may thus look to revive the dormant Commerce
Clause in the context of transportation regulations to challenge
local limitations on their operations.
Importantly, this Note does not argue that any and all safety
or labor concerns offered in efforts to regulate or limit TNC
operations are unfounded or that invalidation of well-intentioned
attempts to regulate for these concerns on dormant Commerce
Clause grounds will somehow take care of them. Genuine concerns
do exist, but the only way to seriously and judiciously confront
them is through even-handed and constitutional legislation that
recognizes that TNCs are parked and here to stay.
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I. Introduction
Getting a Lyft or calling an Uber has become as conspicuous
as the decades-old gesture of raising a hand to hail a cab. Young
“techies” and suit-clad professionals alike pull out their phones in
front of office buildings and bars, requesting a ride and seeing
their driver’s car, user rating, and estimated time of arrival
instantly on their screens.1 With a GPS-equipped smartphone,
one can find a ride across town or a personal chauffeur for the
day with the touch of a button in hundreds of cities worldwide.2
1. See LYFT, https://www.lyft.com (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) (explaining
the application’s features on the website home page) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See
Where
is
Uber
Currently
Available?,
UBER,
https://www.uber.com/cities (last visited Feb. 1 2015) (indicating that as of
December 16, 2014, the service was available in fifty-three countries and more
than 200 cities worldwide) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Cities We’re In, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/cities (last visited Feb. 1, 2015)
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By affording riders the option of either getting a ride from a
tuxedo-attired chauffeur in a luxury sport-utility vehicle or
limousine, or from a nonprofessional in their “daily-driver,”
Transportation Network Companies (TNCs)3 are offering unique
alternatives to taxis.4 It would be no exaggeration to say that we
are witnessing a revolution in the way we get around, if we only
glance up from our phones.5
(noting that Lyft currently operates in over sixty U.S. cities) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See Tomio Geron, California PUC Proposes Legalizing Ride-Sharing
From
Startups
Lyft,
SideCar,
Uber,
FORBES
(July
30,
2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/07/30/california-puc-proposeslegalizing-ride-sharing-companies-lyft-sidecar-uber/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2015)
(noting that TNCs are companies that use online-enabled, smartphone
application platforms to connect drivers and passengers) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See Suzanne Stathatos, Debunking the Pink Mustache: Taxi Alternative
Lyft Launches in San Francisco, SF WKLY (Aug. 31, 2012),
http://www.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2012/08/31/debunking-the-pink-mustachestaxi-alternative-lyft-launches-in-san-francisco (last visited Feb. 1, 2015)
(reporting that Lyft has described itself as offering an iPhone or Android
application “that lets you rent a ‘friend with a car’”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); John P. Pullen, Everything You Need to Know About
Uber, TIME (Nov. 4, 2014), http://time.com/3556741/uber/ (last visited Feb. 1,
2015) (reporting that Uber offers several different levels of service, allowing
passengers to choose between a ride in the likes of a Toyota Prius, all the way
up to top-of-the-line posh options like Porsches and BMWs, with luxury SUVs,
Lincoln Town Cars, and limousines in between) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
5. See Marvin Ammori, Can the FTC Save Uber?, SLATE (Mar. 12, 2013,
12:15
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/03/uber_lyft_sidecar
_can_the_ftc_fight_local_taxi_commissions.single.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2015)
(“Uber, SideCar, and Lyft are not simply a fad—they are the first indications of
a transportation revolution now receiving considerable venture investment.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Don Jergler, Transportation
Network Companies, Uber Gap Worries Insurers, INS. J. (Jan. 10, 2014),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2014/01/10/316839.htm (last visited
Feb. 1, 2015) (noting that Uber has “entered more than 60 markets” and is
purportedly “generating $200 million a year in revenue beyond what it pays to
drivers”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); The Rise of the
Sharing
Economy,
ECONOMIST
(Mar.
9,
2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-risesharing-economy (last visited Jan. 15, 2015) (explaining that the “sharing
economy” allows for a type of business built on the sharing of resources so that
consumers can access goods when needed and “act as an ad hoc taxi service [or]
car-hire firm . . . as and when it suits them”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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Originally conceived as a response to consumer
dissatisfaction with taxi monopolies,6 Uber, Lyft, and other TNCs
are paving the way for a new era in transportation by disrupting
the traditional car-for-hire service industry.7 TNCs create mobile
phone applications that facilitate peer-to-peer car-for-hire
services by connecting passengers who need a ride to drivers who
have a car.8 Though notable differences exist among the
companies’ services,9 they all utilize smart-phone technology to
6. See MARK W. FRANKENA & PAUL A. PAUTLER, FED. TRADE COMM’N, AN
ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
OF
TAXICAB
REGULATION
155
(1984),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/economic-analysistaxicab-regulation/233832.pdf (noting that the deliberate insulation of taxi
companies from competition by local taxi commissions that colluded to limit the
number of available licenses has resulted in dismal taxi service across the
nation and has fleeced residents).
7. See Clayton Christensen, Key Concepts—Disruptive Innovation,
http://www.claytonchristensen.com/key-concepts/ (last visited February 20,
2015) (describing a disruptive innovation as an innovation that helps create a
new market and value network by disrupting an existing market and value
network, displacing an earlier technology, and improving a product or service in
ways that the market does not expect) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
8. See Patrick Hoge, Lyft and Sidecar Replace Voluntary Donations with
Set
Prices,
S.F.
BUS.
TIMES
(Nov.
18,
2013,
12:49
PM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/2013/11/lyft-sidecar-uber-ridesharing.html?page=all (last visited Jan. 9, 2015) (explaining that these TNC
services connect riders through smartphone applications to private individuals
who give rides in privately-owned vehicles) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Maya Kosoff, 2 Lawsuits Could Dramatically Alter the
Business Model for Uber and Lyft, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 30, 2015, 11:10 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-lyft-business-models-threatened-bylawsuits-2015-1 (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (noting that drivers utilize their own
vehicles and are classified as independent contractors, though pending litigation
seeks to reclassify drivers as employees) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
9. See Evan Dashevsky, Uber vs. Lyft: Which Ride-Sharing App Is Best for
You?,
PC
MAG.
(Nov.
18,
2014,
4:08
PM),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2472358,00.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2015)
(outlining the differences between Lyft and Uber’s services app-based, ride-forhire services) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For example,
“UberX” and Lyft are lower cost options, allowing nonprofessional drivers to use
their personal vehicles with no requirement that drivers obtain a car-for-hire
license. See id. (describing the lower-cost services UberX and Lyft and how they
operate). Alternatively, “Uber Black”—Uber’s premium option—offers luxury
sedans and SUVs whose drivers are required to maintain the same municipal
and state licenses as other livery (for-hire) car services. See Pullen, supra note 4
(explaining Uber’s ride-for-hire platform).
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connect available drivers with riders seeking a ride, using
algorithms that factor time and distance in their fare calculation
much like a taxi meter.10
Such “app-based” car-for-hire platforms have met determined
resistance from industry competitors, advocacy groups, and
government regulators who argue that these services are illegal,
unsafe, and competing unfairly.11 Much of this debate has
centered on whether these services amount to illegal taxicab
operations or whether this model of transportation is in a class of
its own, incapable of classification under outdated regulatory
frameworks.12
10. See Dashevsky, supra note 9 (relaying that each ride has a base fare, on
top of which a per-minute and per-mile charge is added, based on an algorithm
that varies by city and by the particular level of demand for the service at the
time of day).
11. See, e.g., Michael Cabanatuan, S.F. Taxi Owners, Cabbies Join Forces
Against Uber, Lyft, Others, SFGATE, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/S-Ftaxi-owners-cabbies-join-forces-against-5773407.php (last updated Sept. 23,
2014, 8:10 AM) (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) (noting that app-based rides, unlike
taxis, are not serving all neighborhoods, providing accessible services to the
disabled, or complying with air-quality requirements) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Christian Hill, Eugene Tells Uber to Cease
Operations,
REGISTER-GUARD
(Oct.
30,
2014),
http://registerguard.com/rg/news/local/32239677-75/eugene-says-uber-operatingillegally-warns-drivers.html.csp# (last visited Jan. 3, 2015) (explaining that
Eugene city officials find Uber to be operating illegally because Uber has not
obtained an operating license under the city’s “public passenger vehicle”
regulations) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review); Tracey Lien &
Russell Mitchell, Uber Sued Over Unlawful Business Practices; Lyft Settles, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 9, 2014, 8:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fitn-uber-lyft-20141209-story.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) (noting that “Los
Angeles and San Francisco district attorneys filed a consumer protection lawsuit
against Uber on Tuesday [Dec. 9, 2014], alleging that the popular ride-hailing
company misleads consumers about the service’s safety, overcharges them and
thumbs its nose at the law,” while Lyft settled similar lawsuits) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Kale Williams, Uber Sued Over Girl’s Death
in S.F.: Family Says Firm’s App Violates Distracted-Driving Laws, SFGATE,
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Uber-sued-over-girl-s-death-in-S-F5178921.php (last updated Jan. 28, 2014, 12:42 PM) (last visited Feb. 1, 2015)
(alleging, in a wrongful death action, that the phone-based interface that drivers
use to find fares contributed to the death of six year-old pedestrian Sofia [Liu]
who was struck and killed by an Uber service provider) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. See RDU Cites Ride-Sharing Services as Illegal Taxis, WRAL.COM
(Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.wral.com/rdu-cites-ride-sharing-services-as-illegaltaxis/14019999/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) (reporting that police at RaleighDurham International Airport, treating Uber and Lyft as illegal taxis, have
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Consequently, TNCs have often faced outright bans,
anachronistic regulations, and numerous legal hurdles.13 In
Miami, anti-Lyft sting operations resulted in drivers facing hefty
fines and impoundment of their personal vehicles.14 In
Washington, D.C., where Uber initially faced an outright ban, the
city council, in its first attempt at regulating Uber, proposed a
scheme by which the fare amount had to be at least five times
that which a taxicab charged for the same ride.15 San Francisco,
the birthplace of Uber and Lyft, vacillated between allowing their
unfettered operation and holding aspects of their operations
been citing TNC drivers for not complying with airport permit regulations) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. See, e.g., Press Release, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, CPUC Cites Passenger
Carriers Lyft, Sidecar, and Uber $20,000 Each for Public Safety Violations (Nov.
14, 2012) (declaring that the California Public Utility Commission issued
$20,000 citations to Lyft, Sidecar, and Uber for operating illegally as charterparty carriers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Lori Aratani,
Virginia Officials Order Uber, Lyft to Stop Operating in the State, WASH. POST
(June
5,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/drgridlock/wp/2014/06/05/virginia-officials-order-uber-lyft-to-stop-operating-in-thestate (last visited Jan. 5, 2015) (maintaining that the app-based services were
operating without proper permits, Richard D. Holcomb, commissioner of the
Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, sent a cease and desist letter to both
Uber and Lyft) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Ellen Huet,
SF, LA District Attorneys Sue Uber, Settle with Lyft Over ‘Misleading’ Business
Violations,
FORBES
(Dec.
9,
2014,
6:44
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/12/09/sf-la-district-attorneys-sueuber-and-lyft-over-misleading-business-violations (last visited Jan. 2, 2015)
(alleging multiple business violations in California’s suit that focuses on the
companies’ messaging to its riders as well as their airport practices) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. See Alyson Shontell, Cops in Miami Are Running a Sting to Catch Lyft
Drivers,
BUS.
INSIDER
(June
7,
2014,
11:36
AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/miami-cops-are-running-a-sting-to-catch-lyftdrivers-2014-6 (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) (“The county had been fining Lyft
drivers up to $2,000 each for failing to get a chauffeur registration and for
operating a for-hire vehicle without a valid for-hire license—both requirements
for cabbies and limo operators.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
15. See James Fallows, Uber vs. Washington, D.C.: This Is Insane,
ATLANTIC
(July
10,
2012,
9:33
AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/07/uber-vs-washington-dcthis-is-insane/259614/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) (reporting that the regulation
sponsored by Councilmember Mary Cheh proposed that in exchange for
approval to operate in the District, Uber “sedans” would be required to charge a
minimum of five times the “drop rate” for taxicabs) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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illegal—eventually deferring to the California Public Utilities
Commission for a coherent approach to regulation.16 Until San
Francisco International Airport recently began allowing TNCs to
operate at its terminals, every airport across the country
maintained bans, enforced with various degrees of vigor and
success.17 Whether the rationales for regulations and bans have
been pretexts for protectionism and resistance to change, or
legitimate expressions of concern for safety and fair business
practices, it is undeniable that they are responses to TNCs
supplying a demand for easy, affordable, and reliable
transportation.18

16. See Larry Downes, Lessons From Uber: Why Innovation and Regulation
Don’t
Mix,
FORBES
(Feb.
6,
2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/2013/02/06/lessons-from-uber-whyinnovation-and-regulation-dont-mix/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) (noting that
regulatory bans and stiff penalties have been lifted, with attending promises to
liberalize, pending Public Utility Commission agreements with TNCs) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
17. See Patrick Kulp, San Francisco Airport First in the U.S. to Reach
Deals
with
Uber,
Lyft,
MASHABLE
(Oct.
21,
2014),
http://mashable.com/2014/10/21/san-francisco-airport-uber-lyft/ (last visited Feb.
1, 2015) (“Uber, Lyft and Sidecar drivers will now be legally allowed to pick up
and drop off passengers at San Francisco International Airport, thanks to deals
the airport just signed with the three companies.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Jessica Kwong, Lyft, Uber Secure SFO Deal, SF
EXAMINER (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/lyft-joinssidecar-in-securing-sfo-deal/Content?oid=2909712 (last visited Feb. 1, 2015)
(“Uber and Lyft have signed deals to operate legally at San Francisco
International Airport . . . the first agreement of its kind for any airport in
California.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
18. See Jeff Stone, Uber, Lyft Almost Always Cheaper than Traditional
Taxis,
Researchers
Find,
INT’L
BUS.
TIMES
(Oct.
13,
2014),
http://www.ibtimes.com/uber-lyft-almost-always-cheaper-traditional-taxisresearchers-find-1703802 (last visited Jan. 1, 2015) (according to a recent
market study, “[c]ustomers riding with Uber and Lyft will spend less than they
would on the same ride with a taxi almost all the time, except in the hours that
the transportation companies have surge pricing in effect”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Gwynedd Stuart, Can Chicago’s Taxi
Industry Survive the Rideshare Revolution?, CHI. READER (Oct. 1, 2014),
http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/rideshare-chicago-uber-lyft-uberx-taxiindustry-cab-drivers-extinct/Content?oid=15165161 (last visited Jan. 1, 2015)
(noting that “Uber and its ilk have made hailing a ride . . . and paying a
reasonably low fare, as easy as a couple of swipes on a smartphone screen”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Demonstrating a clear shift towards a new transportation
landscape,19 TNCs are blowing through all of the yellow and red
lights that have presented roadblocks to their operations.20 After
evading classification and regulation under existing regimes,
Uber and Lyft have themselves sought to exploit the logic of
regulatory capture.21 These tactics evince a broader strategy to
avoid costly litigation and instead work to develop a cooperative
regulatory climate.22 In combination with growing recognition of
their service’s utility and benefits to consumers,23 these strategic
19. See Tomio Geron, AirBnB and the Unstoppable Rise of the Sharing
Economy,
FORBES
(Jan.
23,
2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-the-unstoppablerise-of-the-share-economy/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014) (noting that the sharing
concept has created markets out of things that would not have been considered
monetizable assets before and that this new paradigm is here to stay) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
20. See, e.g., Alexa Vaughn, Ride-Share Cars: Illegal, and All Over Seattle,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(June
16,
2014),
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2021206141_ridesharingappsxml.html
(last visited Nov. 6, 2014) (noting that the drivers and vehicles with Lyft,
Sidecar, and UberX are not licensed with the city of Seattle, and are thereby
illegal, but that has not prompted the city to stop the increasingly popular ridesharing services) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
21. See, e.g., Ryan Lawler, Mr. Kalanick Goes to Washington: How Uber
Won in DC, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 4, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/12/04/mrkalanick-goes-to-washington-how-uber-won-in-dc/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015)
(noting that for a startup that had “previously eschewed politics,” Uber is
learning how to play the game—retaining the services of Jerry Hallisey, a
former California Transportation Commissioner, being a case in point) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
22. See id. (pointing out that Uber has worked closely with D.C. lawmakers
to craft favorable regulations, which it hopes other cities will seek to model).
23. See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, With Uber, Less Reason to Own a Car, N.Y.
TIMES
(June
11,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/technology/personaltech/with-ubers-carsmaybe-we-dont-need-our-own.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2014) (maintaining
that ride-sharing has become a viable alternative to car ownership) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Emily Badger, Are Uber and Lyft
Responsible for Reducing DUIs?, WASH. POST (July 10, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/07/10/are-uber-andlyft-responsible-for-reducing-duis/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2014) (arguing that
services such as Uber and Lyft may be contributing to a reduction in drunk
driving and DUIs by giving the bar-hopping demographic a better way to get
home at night) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Carolyn
Said,
Uber,
Lyft,
Sidecar
Try
Carpool
Service,
SFGATE,
http://www.sfgate.com/technology/article/Uber-Lyft-Sidecar-try-carpool-service5672983.php (last updated Aug. 6, 2014, 5:58 PM) (last visited Nov. 3, 2014)
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maneuvers have led TNCs to become staples in the
transportation landscapes of major metropolitan areas and sleepy
suburbs alike.24 In light of this reality, an ever-increasing number
of state and local governments are beginning to find creative
ways to accommodate and regulate TNCs to realize their benefits
while simultaneously protecting the interests of safety and
revenue.25 Others, however, have persisted in maintaining bans.26
(“The benefits of fewer cars on the road are obvious: less congestion, fewer
emissions, cheaper costs, reduced parking hassles.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
24. See Sean Doogan, As Uber and Its Ilk Expand, Cities Like Anchorage
Struggle to Regulate the ‘Sharing Economy’, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Oct. 19,
2014),
http://www.adn.com/article/20141019/uber-and-its-ilk-expand-citiesanchorage-struggle-regulate-sharing-economy (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (noting
Uber’s explosive growth, both in terms of the ever-expanding number of cities it
serves and its climbing worth) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
25. See Order Instituting Rulemaking on Regulations Relating to
Passenger Carriers, Ridesharing & New Online-Enabled Transp. Servs., D. 1410-016, 2013 WL 5488494, at *1 (Sept. 19, 2013) (establishing California as the
first state to provide a regulatory framework for TNCs); Jesse Paul, UberX Joins
Lyft in Offering Ride-Share Service to Denver Airport, DENVER POST,
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_27043840/denver-international-airportbegin-allowing-uber-operate-at (last updated Dec. 2, 2014, 1:23 AM) (last visited
Jan. 5, 2015) (announcing that the Denver International Airport will begin
allowing services like UberX and Lyft to operate at the main terminal) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. See Aman Batheja, Uber, Lyft Rolling Forward, But Uncertainty
Lingers,
TEX.
TRIB.
(June
10,
2014),
https://www.texastribune.org/2014/06/10/uber-lyft-target-texas-cities-despiteunfriendly-r (last visited Jan. 5, 2015) (explaining that TNCs are illegal under
Austin’s current city transportation code and therefore banned) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Sheldon S. Shafer, Uber and Lyft Pickups
Banned from Airport, COURIER-J. (Nov. 26, 2014, 5:25 PM), http://www.courierjournal.com/story/news/local/2014/11/26/uber-lyft-pickups-bannedairport/19545401 (last visited Jan. 5, 2015) (reporting that the Regional Airport
Authority has advised that Uber and Lyft drivers who work for the ride-sharing
programs cannot pick up passengers at Louisville International Airport) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Jared Shelly, City Council
to
PPA:
Legalize
Lyft
and
Uber,
PHILA.
BUS.
J.,
http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/news/2015/01/30/city-council-to-ppalegalize-lyft-and-uber.html (last updated Jan. 30, 2015, 3:01 PM) (last visited
Feb. 1, 2015) (noting Philadelphia’s fractured regulatory landscape, as the City
Council has introduced a resolution urging the state legislature to make the
services legal pursuant to the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s
approval for TNC operations in the state, despite the Philadelphia Parking
Authority’s ban on TNCs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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This Note examines whether the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine bars certain types of bans or regulations of TNC
platforms.27 Though TNCs have not shown an eagerness to
litigate challenges to their operations, this avenue of defense
remains open—a road once treaded by trucking companies.28
Although Uber has raised a dormant Commerce Clause challenge
to the application of California law to drivers outside of
California,29 such challenges have not been mounted against
efforts to regulate or thwart TNC operations generally.30 While
Congress retains authority to regulate in this area,31 it likely will
not, as most TNC roadway regulations appear to concern matters
within the realm of states’ police powers.32 TNCs may thus look to
revive the dormant Commerce Clause in the context of roadway
regulations to challenge local limitations on their operations.33
Rather than having to fight to establish themselves in each new
27. See infra Part VI (discussing whether certain TNC bans or regulations
are constitutionally impermissible by analogizing to application of the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine in the transportation cases).
28. See infra Part V.B (discussing highway and railroad regulations
examined by the Supreme Court in light of the dormant Commerce Clause’s
prohibition on unduly burdening interstate commerce).
29. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2013 WL
6354534, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013) (noting that Uber argued against the
application of California law to members of a putative class who utilize the app
outside of the state).
30. See infra Part VI (noting that TNCs have yet to invoke the dormancy
doctrine to resist regulatory hurdles, but that such challenges are arguably
viable).
31. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995)
(acknowledging that Congress may regulate the use of the channels and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce as well as activities having a
substantial relation to commerce interstate).
32. See Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59 (1915) (noting that states retain
the authority to regulate within their territory for the betterment of safety,
health, morals, and general welfare of their inhabitants). But see Ammori, supra
note 5 (noting that the FTC’s power to regulate interstate commerce is just as
broad as Congress’s, and just as it regulated local taxi markets by challenging
anticompetitive practices, it could similarly regulate TNCs because interstate
travelers take Ubers to and from airports when they fly across state lines).
Further, TNCs such as Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar are “California-based technology
companies competing in multiple states,” and thereby have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce. Id.
33. See infra Part VI (discussing the potential advantages of challenging
certain archetypical regulations and bans).
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market, TNCs may be able to eradicate certain categories of
regulatory barriers altogether by successfully challenging just
one such regulation that is archetypical of other “types” of
regulations.34
To maintain a grounded analysis, cognizant of the seemingly
unpredictable application of the doctrine,35 this Note examines
TNCs in light of the United States Supreme Court’s articulation
of the dormant Commerce Clause in the “transportation” cases.36
The Court’s application of the doctrine in response to state
attempts to regulate highways—particularly in the wake of their
expansion and subsequent effect on interstate commerce—is
instructive of how courts may apply the doctrine in the context of
TNCs.37 As the majority of regulations promulgated by state and
local governments concerning TNCs purport to address various
road safety concerns,38 comparison to the Court’s treatment of
similarly motivated laws in the context of the transportation
cases may provide insight to the approach courts will take if
dormant Commerce Clause challenges are raised. This Note
maintains that courts will likely utilize the ad hoc balancing

34. See Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce
Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 397–98
(1998) (implying that if a particular type of restriction is violative of the selfexecuting dormancy principle, then sufficiently analogous regulations are
similarly unconstitutional). So long as such invalidation was widely recognized
and given credence, broader advances could be made by TNCs to penetrate
domestic markets. See Lawler, supra note 21 (indicating that regulatory hurdles
have stood in the way of more rapid expansion of the company’s services).
Acknowledging the speed bumps of the unavoidably piecemeal approach to
expansion taken by Uber thus far, Uber CEO Travis Kalanick intimated that
“[e]very city we [Uber] go to, eventually the regulators will make something up
to keep us from rolling out or continuing our business.” Id.
35. See Lawrence, supra note 34, at 403 (1998) (criticizing the Supreme
Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence as “erratic,” with “complex
exceptions” and “dubious consistency”).
36. See infra Part V (providing a framework for how courts will likely
analyze most TNC regulations enacted in pursuit of local health and safety
interests).
37. See infra Part V (discussing the insight that examination of dormant
Commerce Clause challenges in the transportation cases may offer for
evaluating potential dormancy challenges in the TNC context).
38. See infra Part VI (discussing the various types of TNC regulations—
licensing, insurance, and otherwise—enacted in the name of protecting
consumers and others on the road).
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approach articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.39 to analyze
the majority of TNC regulations and bans challenged on dormant
Commerce Clause grounds.40 However, if courts come to
characterize certain types of TNC regulations and bans as
discriminatory or impermissibly protectionist by virtue of their
motivations or effects—finding that they unduly burden
interstate commerce and a federal common market—they will be
met with an almost certainly fatal form of strict scrutiny review
that regards such discrimination as per se invalid.41
This Note is structured as follows: Part II will consider the
breadth of Congress’s commerce power and the extent to which
states may regulate matters affecting interstate commerce.
Explaining the dormant Commerce Clause and the limits it
places on commerce-burdening regulations promulgated by
states, Part III lays the foundation for contending that certain
TNC regulations may run afoul of the dormancy principle. Part
IV describes the framework that the Supreme Court has outlined
for analyzing dormant Commerce Clause challenges. This is
included for two reasons. First, to understand the current
approach for evaluating dormancy challenges, it is important to
note the potholes the Court has encountered in arriving at its
modern interests-balancing test. Second, Part IV further explains
how potential challenges will be evaluated and the consequences
stemming from characterizing a particular regulation as
discriminatory or not. If certain regulations come to be
characterized as discriminatory, impermissibly protectionist, or
overly extraterritorial in reach, they will likely violate the
dormancy doctrine. On the other hand, if certain regulations are
found to be nondiscriminatory and enacted in furtherance of a
legitimate state interest by appropriate means, they will probably
be constitutionally sound. In addition to providing concrete
examples of the Court’s application of the interests-balancing
39. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
40. See infra Part VI (arguing that most regulations will be subject to Pike
balancing because their aim is to affect protections for consumer and roadway
safety, unless they are characterized as impermissibly protectionist and thereby
per se invalid).
41. See infra note 80 and accompanying text (outlining the dormancy
doctrine’s application and explaining that state regulations that discriminate
against interstate commerce face a virtually per se rule of invalidity).
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approach to dormancy challenges, Part V examines the Court’s
application of the doctrine in the context of transportation and
roadway regulations. This section aims to give insight into the
rubric by which roadway regulations of TNCs may be adjudged,
particularly in light of the similar shake-up that TNCs are
having on our transportation infrastructure—one akin to that
caused by the rapid growth of the highway system and interstate
trucking industry. Part VI reviews examples of existing and
possibly forthcoming TNC regulations, arguing that while most
are justified exercises of state’s police powers, others may
potentially run afoul of the dormancy doctrine. Recognizing
states’ interests in regulating TNCs, Part VI also proposes
guidance for the formulation of viable regulations that maintain a
predictable and fair marketplace for TNC platforms. Part VII will
conclude.
II. The Commerce Clause and State Power to Regulate Commerce
Arguably the most far-reaching of the express domestic
powers granted to Congress under Article I, § 8 of the
Constitution is the power to regulate commerce.42 The Court gave
the commerce power its initial interpretation in Gibbons v.
Ogden,43 whereby it outlined the contours of the terms
“commerce” and “among the several states.”44 An expansive vision
of this grant of federal powers prevailed.45
42. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have the power to
regulate commerce among the several states.”); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 3.3, at 247 (4th ed. 2011)
(noting that an exceedingly expansive view of the commerce power has allowed
Congress to enact legislation affecting all areas of life, even those that do not
obviously appear to be economic or interstate in nature).
43. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
44. See id. at 221–22 (finding a New York licensing requirement for out-ofstate operators inconsistent with a congressional act regulating the coasting
trade). In Gibbons, the Court considered the constitutionality of a New York
state law giving individuals the exclusive right to operate steamboats on waters
within state jurisdiction while requiring out-of-state boats to pay substantial
fees for navigation privileges. Id. at 1–3. At issue was whether New York had
exercised authority in a realm reserved exclusively to Congress, namely, the
regulation of interstate commerce. Id. at 26–27. The Court resolved that the
New York law was invalid on the ground that the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution designated power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce and
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Gibbons also gave the Court opportunity to examine whether
Congress’s power to regulate commerce is exclusive or concurrent
with that of the states.46 Although the case was resolved on
Supremacy Clause47 grounds, Justice Marshall considered
whether state inspection laws that had an effect on interstate
commerce were constitutional.48 In delineating the nature of the
commerce power, Justice Marshall resolved that such state
regulation constituted an acceptable exercise of state police power
as opposed to an impermissible exercise of the national power
over interstate commerce.49 Although this distinction was useful
for recognizing acceptable exercises of state police powers, it left
unresolved the issue of how to know when a state law does not
comport with the national commerce power and the effect
therefrom.50
that the broad definition of commerce included navigation and other forms of
commercial intercourse that is “intermingled with” the states. Id. at 189–90.
45. See id. at 196–97 (“This power, like all others vested in Congress, is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitation, other than are prescribed in the Constitution.”).
46. See id. at 13–20 (examining whether the Constitution and its framers
intended for “the States [to] have a concurrent power with Congress, of
regulating commerce”).
47. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the Constitution and federal
laws “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding”); Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 210 (declaring that “the acts of
New
York
must
yield
to
the
law
of
Congress . . . .”).
48. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 61–62 (examining whether such state laws,
having a tangible effect on and amounting to a regulation of interstate
commerce, can be executed in light of Congress’s absolute power to regulate
commerce among the states).
49. See id.
These restrictions imply, that the general power to regulate
commerce, is concurrently in the States, and that it may be exercised
by the States in all cases to which these prohibitions do not extend.
But, the same implication is still stronger from the nature and terms
of those prohibitory clauses. The State may lay duties on imports and
exports, to execute its inspection laws. That class of laws are, or may
be, essential regulations of commerce, and they derive their authority
altogether from State power. The existence of a power to pass them,
is, therefore, expressly recognised by the constitution.
50. See id. (supplying guidance for when regulations may be characterized
as exercises of a state’s police powers).
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Gibbons did not afford Justice Marshall a full opportunity to
pass judgment on the existence of an implied negative aspect of
the Commerce Clause, but Marshall did opine that there was
“great force” in the argument for it.51 Marshall did not hesitate to
note that a state law could be “repugnant to the power to regulate
commerce in its dormant state.”52 In 1849, however, the Court
held “a state’s action violative of the Commerce Clause” for the
first time despite “the absence of a relevant federal statute.”53
Cementing this view of the Commerce Clause’s breadth, the
Court proclaimed that the grant of the commerce power in and of
itself prohibited certain state legislation by rendering
congressional power “exclusive” over “subjects . . . in their nature
national.”54
III. The Dormant Commerce Clause as a Limit on State
Regulation of Commerce
The dormant Commerce Clause is the idea that courts may
invalidate state laws for running afoul of the Commerce Clause
or the limiting principles implied from it.55 As illustrated above,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the grant of power to
Congress in Article I, § 8—to regulate commerce among the
states—as implying a “dormant” or negative aspect, thereby
limiting the ability of states to either “discriminate against”56 or
impose an “undue burden”57 on interstate commerce.58 This legal
51. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 209; see also id. at 227 (Johnson, J., concurring)
(recognizing the dormant Commerce Clause principle by maintaining that
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce “must be exclusive”).
52. See Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 252 (1829)
(expounding on the contours of the of the commerce power after Gibbons).
53. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6–4, at 1047 n.6
(3d ed. 2000) (discussing The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283 (1849), in which the
Court struck down charges on ship masters arriving from out-of-state ports to
defray potential costs associated with incoming passengers).
54. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851).
55. See DAN T. COENEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 209
(2004) (articulating the dormant Commerce Clause in its most simple
formulation).
56. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978).
57. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353 (1951).
58. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1852) (declaring that
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doctrine serves as a self-executing limitation on state power to
regulate interstate commerce and is held to apply even when
Congress has not acted or no preemption is found.59 Although the
dormant Commerce Clause has its opponents,60 it is a centuriesold,61 deeply ingrained doctrine,62 showing no signs of fading from
our constitutional tradition.63 Recognized as one of the most
the grant of the commerce power to Congress in and of itself precluded certain
types of state lawmaking, for congressional power was deemed “exclusive” as to
“subjects . . . in their nature national”), overruled on other grounds, Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
59. See BORIS I. BITTKER, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE § 6.01 (1999) (maintaining that the Supreme Court “has
fashioned a self-executing Commerce Clause, which, when applicable, prohibits
state regulatory action even when Congress has not acted”); CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 42, § 5.3, at 430 (noting that the restriction on state and local
governments from passing unduly burdensome or protectionist laws applies
even in the absence of a conflict between state and federal statutes); Hunt v.
Wash. Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) (maintaining that the
Commerce Clause itself is “a limitation upon state power even without
congressional implementation”).
60. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520
U.S. 564, 611 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The negative Commerce Clause
has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved
virtually unworkable in application.”); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines,
Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that “the negative
commerce clause’ . . . is ‘negative’ not only because it negates state regulation of
commerce, but also because it does not appear in the Constitution”); see also
Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 573 (1987)
(contending that the dormant Commerce Clause “lacks any basis in
constitutional democratic theory,” and that the task of regulating commerce and
invalidating state laws should not be left to an unelected federal judiciary).
61. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 199–200 (1824) (defining broadly the
scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause to include an
independent limit on state power, even where Congress has not acted).
62. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768 (1944)
[It is] accepted constitutional doctrine that the commerce clause,
without the aid of Congressional legislation . . . affords some
protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce,
and that in such cases, where Congress has not acted, this Court, and
not the state legislature, is under the commerce clause the final
arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests.
63. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 435 (“The dormant commerce
clause, of course, is firmly established and has been a part of constitutional law
for almost two centuries.”). As space prohibits a thorough examination and
defense of the doctrine’s foundations, this Note takes the dormant Commerce
Clause as a given—“a doctrinal fact of life that the Court is unlikely to
repudiate.” Brannon P. Denning, The Maine Rx Prescription Drug Plan and the
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important implied limits on state power, the Court’s use of the
doctrine has time and again put the brakes on the forces of
localism that threaten the “retarding and Balkanizing [of]
American commerce, trade, and industry.”64
The doctrine has numerous justifications, but the central
rationale is that “[t]he Constitution . . . was framed upon the
theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim
together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in
union and not division.”65 Pointing out that impediments to
interstate commerce are likely to harm the overall economy,
Professor Donald Regan notes that “protectionism [by states] is
inefficient because it diverts business away from presumptively
low-cost producers without any colorable justification in terms of
a benefit that deserves approval from the point of view of the
nation as a whole.”66 Justice Kennedy reiterated the doctrine’s
importance to our Constitutional forefather’s vision of
government by repeating that “[t]he central rationale for the rule
against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws
whose object is local economic protectionism, laws that would
excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the Constitution
was designed to prevent."67 Positing that states and their citizens
should not be harmed by laws in other states where they lack
political representation, the doctrine maintains that the national
economy is better off if state and local laws impeding interstate
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine: The Case of the Missing Link[Age], 29 AM.
J.L. & MED. 7 n.3 (2003).
64. Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); see Redish & Nugent, supra note 60, at 574–75 (“[T]he Court,
relying on the clause, has invalidated state licensing requirements, train length
restrictions, mudguard requirements, truck length prohibitions, and various
produce regulations.” (citations omitted)).
65. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
66. Donald Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1118 (1986); see
Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce
Clause,
110
YALE
L.J.
785,
794–808 (2001) (arguing that primary purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause
is to combat the trade protectionism that can result from decentralized
regulation by individual states).
67. See C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 143–45 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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commerce are invalidated.68 All of these justifications serve to
emphasize that states’ obstructions to interstate commerce and
discrimination against those from other states frustrate the goal
of maintaining a federal common market for goods and services.69
IV. Setting a Standard of Review for Dormant Commerce Clause
Challenges
A. Initial Speed Bumps
Notwithstanding the doctrine’s enshrinement in our
constitutional jurisprudence, the Court has struggled to outline
clearly the scope and application of the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine as well as how aggressively courts should
scrutinize state and local laws.70 Consistency has never been the
hallmark of adjudication in this area of the law, and “no
conceptual approach identifies all of the factors that may bear on
a particular case.”71 After giving life to the doctrine in Gibbons,
and to provide predictability for lawmakers and regulators, the
Court attempted to draw rigid categories of areas where federal
law was exclusive and those where states could regulate.72
68. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 432–33 (illuminating the
economic and political justifications for the dormant Commerce Clause).
69. See id. at 433 (noting that the numerous justifications for the doctrine
are not mutually exclusive and instead share a common thread).
70. See, e.g., The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 283 (1849) (invalidating a
New York law, by a Court split five to four, that required every incoming
passenger to pay for the costs of health inspections and treatment, with every
Justice writing a separate opinion); COENEN, supra note 55, at 209 (“Application
. . . [of the doctrine] requires courts to make tough contextual judgments as they
work their way through an endless stream of cases involving every imaginable
form of state law.”).
71. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441 (1978); see also
COENEN, supra note 55, at 222 (“This introduction to the dormant Commerce
Clause principle reveals . . . its doctrinal complexity. What’s more, this
summary understates that complexity because the Court sometimes structures
its analysis in ways that do not fit neatly within this framework.”).
72. See DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 37 (1927) (distinguishing
between state laws that directly interfered with interstate commerce, and thus
were invalid, as opposed to those that only had an indirect effect and were
permissible); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319–20 (1851)
(distinguishing between subject matter that is national, in which event state
laws are invalidated under the dormant Commerce Clause, and subject matter
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Having recognized the difficulties of a formalistic, categorical
approach, the Court shifted gears in 1945, moving instead
towards an interests-balancing approach for seemingly
nondiscriminatory laws, while retaining a categorical approach
for those held to be impermissibly protectionist and
discriminatory.73
B. Towards a Cohesive Analytic Framework: Incorporating an
Interests-Balancing Approach
The Court’s modern approach to dormant Commerce Clause
challenges is no longer based on rigid categories—national versus
local subject matter, and direct versus indirect interference—but
rather on courts balancing the benefits of a law against the
burdens that it imposes on interstate commerce.74 The Court
emphasized that dormant Commerce Clause analysis must turn
on “the relative weights of the state and national interests
involved.”75 Recognizing the fact-sensitive nature of determining
whether a statute has violated the dormancy doctrine, one apt
commentator and advocate of the Court’s balancing approach
pointed out that “[o]nly by an evaluation of all the facts and
circumstances can such an issue be decided by the Court.”76
that is local, in which event state laws are allowed); Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 199–
200 (1824) (drawing a distinction between a state’s exercise of its police power
and a state exercising the federal power over commerce).
73. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770 (1945)
Hence the matters for ultimate determination here are the nature
and extent of the burden which the state regulation of interstate
trains, adopted as a safety measure, imposes on interstate commerce,
and whether the relative weights of the state and national interests
involved are such [as to make the law permissible].
74. The origin of this modern approach is generally credited to the
scholarship of Noel Dowling. See Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and
State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1, 21–24 (1940) (advocating for what has become the
modern balancing approach).
75. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 770.
76. Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power—Revised
Version, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 1938–1962, at 280, 290.
Dowling illustrated:
Discrimination is a delusively simple term. How overreaching must a
state measure be to merit condemnation as discriminatory? It seems
apparent that in answering this question the Court must make the
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Although this balancing approach afforded courts great
discretion in weighing a law’s burden on interstate commerce
against its putative benefits to the state or local government, the
Court has since delineated a predictable framework for ad hoc
balancing77 that involves a two-tiered structure for analyzing
dormant Commerce Clause challenges.78
First, the Court asks whether the law, either on its face or in
purpose or effect, discriminates against interstate commerce or
out-of-state commercial actors.79 Laws that do are subject to a per
se presumption of invalidity80 and are sustained only upon a
same sort of value judgment that it has been making in performing
its broader protective function. Discrimination exists or not,
depending upon whether there is an economic justification for the
difference in treatment which the state accords interstate commerce.
Id. at 290.
77. See COENEN, supra note 55, at 220 (“The Court’s many modern
decisions set out an overarching structure . . . for evaluating dormant Commerce
Clause cases.”). But see id. at 222 (pointing out that the Court, at times,
combines Pike balancing and extra-territoriality analysis, reverts to Cooley’s
local-versus-national rhetoric or combines terminology and tests from its older
jurisprudence); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 440 (maintaining that the
way in which the Court balances is not the same in all dormant Commerce
Clause cases).
78. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 441 (explaining the twotiered structure of analyzing dormant Commerce Clause challenges); Will Sears,
Full-Impact Regulations and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 157, 162 (2014) (noting that courts employ this approach to
distinguish between regulations that directly or purposefully discriminate
against interstate commerce and facially neutral regulations that indirectly
burden interstate commerce). There are, however, exceptions to the dormant
commerce clause—situations where laws otherwise violative of the doctrine are
permissible. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 431 (noting the
Congressional approval exception and “the market participation exception”).
Neither of these exceptions is relevant in this context because Congress has not
approved any of these state or local actions, and state and local governments
have not sought to favor their “own citizens in receiving benefits from state and
local governments or in dealing with government-owned businesses.” Id. at 431–
32.
79. See COENEN, supra note 55, at 224 (“The core of the modern dormant
Commerce Clause principle lies in its prohibition of state laws that discriminate
against interstate commerce.”); e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert.
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) (analyzing whether the challenged statute
had a discriminatory effect on interstate sales in order to approximate the
appropriate legal standard).
80. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005) (“State laws that
discriminate against interstate commerce face a virtually per se rule of
invalidity.”).
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showing by the state that the law serves an important local
purpose and less discriminatory alternatives do not exist.81 Laws
aiming to regulate commerce extraterritorially are similarly
suspect under this strict per se rule.82
If, on the other hand, the law is deemed nondiscriminatory
towards out-of-staters, then a simple balancing test is used.83
This balancing approach weighs “the law’s burdens on interstate
commerce against its benefits.”84 If the law’s burden is “clearly
excessive” in relation to its “putative local benefits,” it will be
found unconstitutional.85 In contrast to discriminatory laws,
those deemed nondiscriminatory are presumptively valid and
afforded deference.86 This category is typically comprised of laws
enacted pursuant to a state’s police powers, aiming to safeguard
local health and safety.87 The Court’s modern interests-balancing
approach, outlined in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,88 is ordinarily
used to evaluate the constitutionality of such regulations.89
81. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 440 (“[T]he law . . . will be
upheld only if it is necessary to achieve an important purpose.”).
82. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
573, 582 (1986) (“New York’s liquor affirmation statute . . . regulates out-of-state
transactions in violation of the Commerce Clause.”).
83. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 448 (explaining that local
laws treating all alike, regardless of residence, are subject to a balancing test).
84. Id.
85. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
86. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 440 (noting that if the law is
nondiscriminatory, then the presumption is in favor of upholding the law).
87. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 440 (explaining that laws
enacted pursuant to a state’s police powers are typically afforded deference,
especially if they don’t expressly aim to regulate commerce).
88. See 397 U.S. 137, 145–46 (1970) (concluding that the burden placed on
interstate commerce by Arizona’s state-of-origin packaging law is
unconstitutional because Arizona’s interest in identifying the origin of
cantaloupes is outweighed by the heavy cost of building and operating a packing
plant in Arizona). In Pike, the Court considered the constitutionality of a
provision of the Arizona Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act which
prohibited interstate shipment of cantaloupes not packed in regular compact
arrangements in closed standard containers. Id. at 138. Pike, the Arizona
official in charge of enforcing the law, issued an order prohibiting a cantaloupe
farming company from transporting uncrated cantaloupes from their Arizona
ranch to a California packing and processing plant. Id. The Court maintained
that a neutral statute with a legitimate purpose will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce exceeds the putative local benefits. Id. at
142. Applying this test to the Arizona statute, the Court found it
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C. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.: The Court’s Modern Balancing
Approach
Pike indicated that, “[w]here the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local interest, and its effects
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits.”90 As summarized by
Russell Chapin, the Pike balancing test should work as follows:91
“As a threshold matter there is an inquiry as to whether the state
interest is ‘legitimate’ (that is, not protectionist), and whether the
regulation’s effect on interstate commerce is ‘incidental’ (that is,
regulation of interstate commerce is not the overriding state
interest).”92 A prima facie case to overturn the regulation can be
made by showing discriminatory intent; that the regulation
substantially burdens interstate commerce; or that the regulation
burdens out-of-state interests more than it benefits in-state
interests.93 In response, the state must prove that “the regulation
substantially serves legitimate local interests and that its burden
on interstate commerce is justified by the claimed local benefit.”94
The state must also show that the incidental burden that the
regulation has on interstate commerce regulation “is the least
burdensome
alternative.”95
To
date,
however,
no
unconstitutional given that the State’s interest in promoting and preserving the
reputation of Arizona growers was not important enough to justify the burden
on interstate commerce prohibiting deceptive packaging imposed. Id. at 145.
89. See Russell f, Chadha, Garcia and the Dormant Commerce Clause
Limitation on State Authority to Regulate, 23 URB. LAW. 163, 168 (1991)
(outlining and summarizing the threshold questions and characterizations for
dormant Commerce Clause analysis).
90. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
91. See Chapin, supra note 89, at 168 (detailing the analytical framework
for dormant Commerce Clause analysis).
92. Id.
93. See id. (explaining how challengers can make a prima facie case that
the dormancy doctrine has been violated when the Pike balancing test is used).
94. Id.
95. Id.; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 451 (noting that the
Court “generally includes a ‘least restrictive alternative’ component”);
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S 456, 473 (1981) (finding a
recycling law constitutional because less commerce-burdening activities were
unavailing).
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nondiscriminatory state law has been invalidated on the ground
that its goal could be achieved by means less burdensome on
interstate commerce.96
As a consequence of the deference afforded to laws that
appear tied to a state’s police power, health and safety laws are
typically invalidated only upon showing that the law’s burdens on
interstate commerce clearly outweigh its benefits.97 But notably,
the deferential Pike balancing is not without teeth.98
Notwithstanding the Court’s vacillations on the vigor with which
it would invoke the doctrine, it has made it abundantly clear,
particularly in the context of laws regulating key channels of
interstate commerce, that “[the] Court, and not the state
legislature, is . . . the final arbiter of the competing demands of
state and national interest.”99
1. A Difficult Threshold Question
Given the consequences of characterizing a state’s purpose as
either discriminatory or legitimate, addressing this threshold
matter is critical in assessing the validity of a state regulation.100
Unsurprisingly, difficulties arise in identifying whether the state
law has a discriminatory purpose.101 Facially nondiscriminatory
96. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 451 (noting that laws found
violative of the dormancy principle based on the existence of a less restrictive
alternative all involved discrimination).
97. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one
of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will, of
course, depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.
98. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (recognizing that
even statutes that regulate evenhandedly may fall victim to the dormancy
doctrine).
99. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768 (1944).
100. See supra notes 80–89 and accompanying text (noting that
discriminatory regulations receive a practically fatal variety of strict scrutiny
whereas neutral regulations based on legitimate state interests receive
deferential review).
101. See COENEN, supra note 55, at 240 (noting that three questions arise:
“(1) What is a discriminatory purpose?; (2) How should courts go about the
business of characterizing state purposes?; and (3) How does one prove that an
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statutes preceded by preambles indicating a purpose to bolter a
state’s economic advantages while neutralizing out-of-state
competition are few and far between.102 The vast majority of cases
are thornier, as not all regulations with an economic purpose are
protectionist or discriminatory.103 Many state laws that “guard
against road wear, unfair trade practices, monopolization, and
even theft have economic purposes entirely proper for states to
pursue.”104
An analogous issue is that of “characteriz[ing] the purpose
with which the legislature has acted.”105 Looking past the state’s
purported safety justification, the Court in Buck v. Kuykendall106
found that the “state’s refusal to license the operation of a
Portland-to-Seattle ‘auto stage line’ on the ground that the route
applied for was already adequately served was impermissible.”107
The characterization of this regulation as discriminatory
amounted to its violation of the dormancy principle. The primary
purpose was not “regulation with a view to safety or to
conservation of the highways, but the prohibition of
competition.”108

allegedly improper purpose was the actual purpose that drove the government’s
decision?”).
102. See id. (noting that it is easy to detect discrimination in cases where
there is a “smoking gun,” such as a near candid admission that the purpose of a
law is to keep foreign goods out or to insulate local industry from competition);
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (insisting that the
courts must look beyond “the rare instance where the state artlessly discloses an
avowed purpose to discriminate against interstate goods”).
103. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179,
187–88 (1950) (explaining that a state’s price-fixing of natural gas extracted in
the state to curtail demand was not marked by a discriminatory purpose by
reasoning that the law limited gas sales “whether destined for interstate or
intrastate consumers” in a way reasonably tailored to conserving a scarce
resource).
104. COENEN, supra note 55, at 242. But see H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond,
336 U.S. 525, 526, 535 (1949) (endorsing broad state authority to protect the
“health and safety” of residents but finding fault with license denial that would
“protect and advance local economic interests”).
105. COENEN, supra note 55, at 242
106. 267 U.S. 307 (1925).
107. COENEN, supra note 55, at 242.
108. Buck, 267 U.S. at 315.
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V. The Transportation Cases
Although courts afford great deference to state regulations in
the field of highway safety as challengers must overcome a
“strong presumption of validity,”109 the Supreme Court has
established that maintaining a cohesive and unburdened national
highway network is a substantial countervailing interest.110
Particularly in transportation cases, the Court has shown a
greater inclination to do more under the dormant Commerce
Clause than merely suppress state protectionism.111 Viewing an
effective transportation network as essential to promoting a
federal common market for goods and services, the Court often
has not afforded ordinary Pike deference to challenged
nondiscriminatory regulations.112 Taking the transportation cases
as a whole, it appears that a “specialized version of the Pike
balancing test [emerges] in highway safety (or perhaps all safety)
cases.”113
A. Interests-Balancing in Pre-Pike Transportation Cases
Though the Court initially “sounded a theme of deference”114
towards safety-oriented transportation regulations, the Court
109. Lisa J. Petricone, The Dormant Commerce Clause: A Sensible Standard
of Review, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 443, 448–49 (1987).
110. See Regan, supra note 66, at 1177 (noting that there is a national
interest in the existence of an effective transportation network linking the
states, which is as essential to genuine political union as the suppression of
protectionism).
111. See id. at 1182 (insisting that the Court appears to go beyond merely
suppressing protectionism in transportation cases more often than it does in
movement-of-goods cases); infra Part V.B (noting that the Court has critically
examined commerce-burdening legislation aimed at regulating critical channels
and instrumentalities of interstate commerce).
112. See Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (noting that the doctrine has served to retard the Balkanization of
“American commerce, trade, and industry”); Regan, supra note 66, at 1184
(indicating reasons for the special importance of an effective transportation
network).
113. See id. at 1177 (delineating the recognized strong interest in
maintaining an unburdened national transportation infrastructure).
114. COENEN, supra note 55, at 256; see South Carolina State Highway Dep’t
v. Barnwell Bros. Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 192 (1938) (upholding a vehicle weight and
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soon shifted gears in the seminal pre-Pike case of Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona.115 “Using a balancing methodology to
invalidate a facially neutral Arizona train-length law,”116 the
Court laid the foundation for ad hoc balancing in the
transportation context.117 Unlike in past examinations of
transportation regulations enacted in the name of public
safety,118 the Court closely scrutinized all of the pertinent
consequences of the state regulation alongside its intersection
with the regulations of neighboring states.119
The Court began its examination of the challenged regulation
by proceeding to outline the countervailing state and federal
interests.120 First analyzing the federal-interest side of the
balance, the Court maintained that there was “no doubt that the
Arizona Train Limit Law impose[d] a serious burden . . . on
interstate commerce.”121 Acknowledging that Arizona was one of
only two states limiting freight trains to seventy cars and stood
width limit upon finding a “rational basis” for the state’s judgment that its
regulations reduced highway accidents).
115. 325 U.S. 761 (1945); see supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text
(noting the Supreme Court’s shift towards an interests-balancing approach in
the context of safety-oriented regulations).
116. COENEN, supra note 55, at 257. “Train length” refers to the number of
cars in length that a train is permitted to be. See S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 771–72
(defining “train length”).
117. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (explaining that Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona signaled a shift towards an interests-balancing approach
for dormant Commerce Clause challenges); see also Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, Inc., 358 U.S. 520, 529 (1959) (concluding that an Illinois statute
requiring use of contour rear fender mudguards on trucks and trailers operated
on state highways, rather than customary straight mudguards, though a
nondiscriminatory local safety measure, placed an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce).
118. See Barnwell Bros. Inc., 303 U.S. at 192 (affording deference to South
Carolina’s motor vehicle width and weight limits upon deeming it sufficient that
there was a “rational basis” for the state’s judgment that its regulations
improved highway safety); Bradley v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 289 U.S. 92, 94–98
(1933) (acceding to Ohio’s refusal to authorize a new motorized common-carrier
service between Cleveland and western Michigan by proceeding with a cautious
balancing analysis).
119. See S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 773–79 (examining closely the practical
effects that the regulation would have on interstate commerce).
120. See id. at 773 (evaluating the competing interests in regulating train
length in this context).
121. Id.

KEEP ON TRUCKIN’, UBER

163

alone in limiting passenger trains to fourteen cars, the Court
intimated that Arizona’s law was significantly out of step with
other states’ regulations.122 An inevitable consequence of the law
would be significant cost increases for carriers, requiring either
the breaking up of long trains upon entrance into Arizona or
rerouting them altogether to avoid entry into the state.123 In
evaluating the resulting burden on interstate, the Court noted
that the regulation cost the Southern Pacific company alone
about one million dollars per year; that 95% percent of Arizona’s
rail traffic was interstate in nature; that the law effectively
controlled “train operations beyond the boundaries of the state”
by requiring train reconfiguration as far away as Los Angeles,
California and El Paso, Texas; and that the cross-border
deliveries would almost certainly face delays.124
On the state-interest side of the balance, the Court took note
of the trial court’s findings “that the Arizona law had no
reasonable relation to safety” and in fact “made train operation
more dangerous.”125 Although the Arizona Supreme Court had
not accepted these factual determinations, the U.S. Supreme
Court was persuaded that any safety advantage gained by
shortening trains was effectively “offset by the increase in the
number of accidents resulting from the larger number of trains
when train lengths are reduced.”126 The Court deemed it
significant that the primary safety problems associated with long
trains—so-called slack-action accidents—were “relatively the
same” in Arizona as in Nevada, which handled “substantially the
same amount of traffic” without regulating train lengths at all.127
The Court distinguished earlier cases upholding state laws
that required locomotive headlights and full train crews both
because those laws genuinely “removed or reduced safety
hazards” and because they created no substantial interference
122. See id. (noting that Arizona’s regulation was inconsistent with the
approach that the vast majority of states had taken).
123. See id. (accounting for the economic consequences that such a
regulation would have on carriers).
124. See id. at 775 (noting the commerce-burdening practical realities
resulting from the regulation).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 778.
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with the interstate movement of trains.128 In a similar vein, the
Court distinguished Barnwell not only because it involved
government-maintained highways but also because its stringent
width and weight rules fell on intrastate and interstate truckers
alike.129 In contrast, as Chief Justice Stone explained in Southern
Pacific, “the burden of [Arizona’s train-length] regulation falls on
interests outside the state” so that it was “unlikely to be
alleviated by the operation of those political restraints normally
exerted when interests within the state are affected.”130
The Court in Southern Pacific emphasized that a state could
not avoid the restraints of the dormant Commerce Clause by
“simply invoking the convenient apologetics of the police
power.”131 Rather, “the decisive question is whether in the
circumstances the total effect of the law as a safety measure in
reducing accidents and casualties is so slight and problematical
as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate
commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it.”132
The Arizona train law flunked this test because it generated “at
most a slight and dubious” safety advantage while “preventing
the free flow of commerce by delaying it and by substantially
increasing its cost and impairing its efficiency.”133
In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,134 the court utilized the
same balancing approach to strike down an Illinois law requiring
all commercial trucks operating in the state to be equipped with a
certain type of mudguard.135 Just as in Southern Pacific, there
was no federal regulation on this point, but “straight” mudguards
were the industry standard and “legal in at least 45 States.”136
Illinois maintained that curved mudguards were more effective in
128. Id. at 779.
129. See id. at 765 n.2 (explaining that the burden of Arizona’s regulation
fell almost entirely on interests outside the state).
130. Id. at 765 n.2.
131. Id. at 780.
132. Id. at 775–76.
133. Id. at 779.
134. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
135. See id. at 529 (invalidating an Illinois law requiring trucks to use
“contour” mudguards whilst almost all states authorized—and in some
instances mandated—the use of “straight” mudguards).
136. Id. at 523.
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preventing stones and debris from being kicked up from the back
of trucks, thereby having greater potential to reduce accidents
resulting therefrom.137 For trucking companies moving goods
through Illinois the practical effect would be to require drivers to
use one type of mudguards when traveling through Illinois, and
another while in other states—or switch to curved mudguards
altogether.138 Unlike in Southern Pacific, the Court was
unanimous in finding the statute unconstitutional.139
While acknowledging that state “safety measures carry a
strong presumption of validity,”140 the Court found the alleged
benefits in increased safety were outweighed by the heavy burden
on interstate commerce resulting from out-of-state truck drivers
having to stop at the Illinois border to change mudguards.141
Courts typically refused to pass judgment on the best way to
achieve safety objectives, as policy decisions in this field are “for
the state legislature, absent federal entry . . . .”142 But, if the
“total effect of a law as a safety measure in reducing accidents
and casualties” does not outweigh the “national interest in
keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which
seriously impede it,” the law may run afoul of the dormancy
doctrine.143
Southern Pacific and Bibb laid the groundwork for the
Court’s subsequent application of the Pike balancing test in the
transportation context, formalizing the analytic framework for
evaluating nondiscriminatory regulations enacted in furtherance
of local health and safety.

137. See id. at 525 (“Illinois introduced evidence seeking to establish that
contour mudguards had a decided safety factor in that they prevented the
throwing of debris into the faces of drivers of passing cars and into the
windshields of a following vehicle.”).
138. See id. at 524 (noting the substantial burden and potential
extraterritorial effect that this regulation would have on interstate commerce).
139. See id. at 520 (establishing that all the Justices agreed with Justice
Douglas’s reasoning and the Court’s result).
140. Id.
141. See id. at 530 (“[T]he heavy burden which the Illinois mudguard law
places on the interstate movement of trucks and trailers seems to us to pass the
permissible limits even for safety regulations.”).
142. Id. at 524.
143. Id.
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B. Pike Interests-Balancing in the Trucking Cases

Despite originally stating a reluctance to use the Commerce
Clause to invalidate state regulations in the field of safety,144 the
Court struck down two nondiscriminatory statutes enacted in the
name of regulating highway safety shortly after announcing the
Pike balancing test.145 Because the existence of a legitimate state
interest in regulating transportation on municipal roads and
interstate highways in furtherance of public safety is rarely in
dispute, the Court has instead focused its attention on
scrutinizing the rational relationship between the state objective
and the regulation.146 This approach to balancing in the
transportation safety context was evident in Raymond Motor
Transportation, Inc. v. Rice147—the first case in which a
nondiscriminatory motor-vehicle law was invalidated using the
Pike test.148
At issue in Raymond was whether Wisconsin regulations
“governing the length and configuration of trucks that may be
operated within the State” violate the dormant Commerce
Clause.149 Of particular relevance was a Wisconsin statute setting
a limit of fifty-five-feet “on the overall length of a vehicle pulling
one trailer” and prohibiting double-trailer trucks.150 The Court
ultimately ruled that the regulation violated the dormancy
doctrine because its contribution to highway safety was no more
144. See Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 190–91 (affording deference to a
regulation enacted pursuant to a state’s police powers).
145. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981)
(finding an Iowa statute prohibiting the use of sixty-five-foot double trailer
trucks within its borders unconstitutional); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v.
Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447 (1978) (finding a Wisconsin regulation barring trucks
longer than 55 feet from traveling on state highways without a permit to be
unconstitutional).
146. See, e.g., Kassel, 450 U.S. at 680–81 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“It is not
the function of the court to decide whether in fact the regulation promotes its
intended purpose, so long as an examination of the evidence before or available
to the lawmaker indicates that the regulation is not wholly irrational in light of
its purposes.”).
147. 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
148. See id. at 447 (finding a Wisconsin statute limiting truck lengths to
fifty-five feet violative of the dormancy doctrine).
149. Id. at 430.
150. Id. at 432.
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than “speculative,” while the burden it placed on interstate
commerce was substantial.151 Raymond was of limited
precedential value,152 however, because Wisconsin offered
practically no evidence indicating that the longer trucks were less
safe.153 Additionally, the state offered no response to the
challengers’ contention that exclusion of sixty-five-foot “doubles”
would significantly burden interstate commerce.154 Less than
three years later, the Court took notice of a nearly identical
statute, but this time it was supported with substantial
legislative findings on its local safety benefits.155
In Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,156 the Court
again considered whether a truck-length limitation was an
unreasonable safety measure in contravention of the dormant
Commerce Clause.157 Iowa, unlike all its neighboring states,
prohibited sixty-five-foot “double” trucks within its borders,
maintaining that this was a purely local regulation concerning
roadway safety.158 Although Iowa did offer some evidence of a
safety justification,159 the Court was unwilling to defer to Iowa’s
legislature that the statute furthered roadway safety—instead
maintaining that the “illusory” safety justification unduly
151. See id. at 447 (indicating that the balance tipped significantly in favor
of invalidating the regulations).
152. See id. at 447 (“Our holding is a narrow one, for we do not decide
whether laws of other States restricting the operation of trucks over 55 feet . . .
would be upheld if the evidence . . . were not so overwhelmingly one-sided as in
this case.”)
153. See id. at 448 (“Wisconsin has failed to make even a colorable showing
that its regulations contribute to highway safety.”).
154. See id. at 445 (noting that the regulations were shown, “without
contradiction,” to “impose a substantial burden on the interstate movement of
goods”).
155. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671–72 (1981)
(“Iowa [has] made a more serious effort to support the safety rationale of its law
than did Wisconsin in Raymond, but its efforts was no more persuasive.”).
156. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
157. See id. at 664 (analyzing whether Iowa’s prohibition of certain large
trucks within the State unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce).
158. See id. at 665 (noting that all other Western and Midwestern States
authorized the sixty-five-foot doubles that Iowa sought to exclude).
159. See id. at 672 (noting that Iowa pointed to three ways in which the
fifty-five-foot singles were “arguably superior: singles take less time to be passed
and to clear intersections; they may back up for longer distances; and they are
somewhat less likely to jackknife”).
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burdened interstate commerce.160 Revealing an intention to apply
a more rigorous version of rational basis review, the Court
maintained that Iowa failed to produce any persuasive evidence
that sixty-five-foot trucks are less safe than fifty-five-foot
trucks.161 The Court made clear that “[r]egulations designed for
that salutary purpose [(safety)] nevertheless may further the
purpose so marginally, and interfere with commerce so
substantially, as to be invalid under the Commerce Clause.”162
Justice Powell’s plurality opinion in Kassel, weighing the
asserted safety purpose against the degree of interference with
interstate commerce, has come to be “considered the standard of
review for highway safety regulations challenged under the
Commerce Clause.”163 Willing to second-guess legislative
judgments in the field of safety, Powell’s approach has informed
the Court’s subsequent treatment of municipal and state highway
safety regulations.164 Safety benefits deemed “demonstrably
trivial,”165 “illusory, insubstantial, or nonexistent,”166 would be
jettisoned, although it was unclear how closely the Court
intended to scrutinize numerical cutoffs that necessarily arise in
lawmaking.167 Kassel’s modified Pike approach to roadway
regulations will likely be used by courts to evaluate
nondiscriminatory TNC regulations enacted in furtherance of
public health and safety.168
160. See id. at 671–75 (reasoning that the law could actually increase costs
and accidents as shippers would travel additional miles to circumvent Iowa or
be compelled to use more trucks to transport goods through the state).
161. See id. at 671 (finding support in the record that the sixty-five-foot
doubles were just as safe as the fifty-five-foot singles and sixty-foot doubles that
Iowa law permitted.)
162. Id. at 670; see id. at 671 (concluding that an Iowa statute limiting
truck-length violated the dormant Commerce Clause).
163. Petricone, supra note 109, at 449.
164. See COENEN, supra note 56, at 265 (noting that all of the Justices in
Kassel agreed that “claimed safety justifications will not always support
validation of commerce-burdening legislation”).
165. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 697 n.8 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
166. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 681 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring).
167. See id. at 697 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that numerical
cutoffs generally incorporate a degree of arbitrariness and that “[l]ines drawn
for safety purposes will rarely pass muster if the question is whether a slight
increment can be permitted without sacrificing safety”).
168. See Petricone, supra note 109, at 448 (stating that Kassel is “generally
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Although the “4-2-3” decision in Kassel did reveal differences
of opinion among the Justices, they all agreed that “claimed
safety justifications will not always support validation of
commerce-burdening legislation.”169 Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Marshall, concurred in the judgment that the Iowa law
offended the dormancy doctrine.170 In Justice Brennan’s view,
however, judicial second-guessing of legislative judgments “in the
field of safety” is unwarranted and was unnecessary in the
instant case.171 Finding sufficient evidence that the law amounted
to thinly veiled protectionism, Justice Brennan reasoned that the
problem with the law lay in its impermissibly discriminatory
purpose.172 This difference in approach stemmed from the
Justices’ differing characterizations of the statute’s purpose;
namely, whether it was patently protectionist or aimed towards
promoting local health and safety.173 Occasionally, both
motivations can be gleaned from a particular regulation.174 But
where an impermissibly discriminatory purpose cannot be
unequivocally established, courts may nevertheless succumb to
suspicions that a state’s true purpose is self-serving, as seemed to
be the case in Kassel.175 Such considerations may color courts’
considered the standard of review for highway safety regulations challenged
under the commerce clause”).
169. COENEN, supra note 55, at 264.
170. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 679, 686 (Brennan, J., concurring) (viewing the
same considerations that dictated the holding in Raymond as requiring
invalidation of Iowa’s regulation prohibiting sixty-five-foot doubles).
171. Id. at 680–81 n.1.
172. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 686 (Brennan, J., concurring) (deeming the
dormancy doctrine to proscribe protectionism by way of imposing undue
financial and safety costs of road use on other states).
173. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the consequences of characterizing a
regulation as either discriminatory and thereby presumptively invalid, or
nondiscriminatory, subject instead to a Pike balancing test).
174. Compare Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670 (viewing Iowa’s highway safety
regulations as an effort to govern a matter of local concern), with Kassel, 450
U.S. at 681–85 (Brennan, J. concurring) (noting that by seeking to “discourage
interstate traffic” on its highways, Iowa’s regulation had “nothing to do with
these purported [safety] differences” and were instead “protectionist in nature”).
175. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 685 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that while
the majority opinion recognized “that the State's actual purpose in maintaining
the truck-length regulation was ‘to limit the use of its highways by deflecting
some through traffic,’” it failed “to recognize that this purpose, being
protectionist in nature, is impermissible under the Commerce Clause”).
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application of the Pike balancing test, compelling judges to
characterize stated safety interests as “illusory” if “a heavy
burden on commerce hangs in the balance.”176
Most significantly, Kassel revealed that the dormant
Commerce Clause is “alive and well in the road regulation
context.”177 Taken together with Raymond and its pre-Pike
predecessors, the Court demonstrated readiness to invalidate
nondiscriminatory
commerce-burdening
regulations
of
178
transportation during an era of rapid growth of the interstate
highway system and trucking industry.179 It is possible that lower
courts may undertake a similar posture when faced with
evaluating states’ responses to the present, albeit unique, shakeup of our transportation infrastructure.180
VI. Dormant Commerce Clause Limits to TNC Regulations
A. TNC Regulations Fall Within the Purview of the Commerce
Clause
State regulations of TNCs falls under the purview of the
commerce clause because they regulate the channels and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce as well as actions that
substantially affect interstate commerce.181 By regulating
176. See COENEN, supra note 55, at 265 (noting that these factors may lead
judges to forego the strong rule of deference in the context of local health and
safety regulations).
177. See id. at 266.
178. See supra Part V (discussing safety-oriented nondiscriminatory
transportation regulations found to violate the dormancy doctrine).
179. See WENDELL COX & JEAN LOVE, AMERICAN HIGHWAY USERS ALLIANCE,
40 YEARS OF THE US INTERSTATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM: AN ANALYSIS 4 (1996) (noting
that following its authorization in 1956, the Interstate Highway System grew
rapidly, both in terms of absolute length and in terms of traffic volume—
carrying approximately 23% of the market share of all transportation systems).
180. See Regan, supra note 66, at 1182 (insisting that laws affecting the
federal common market by regulating transportation have been subject to
greater scrutiny by the Supreme Court than other nondiscriminatory commerceburdening regulations).
181. See Heart of Atl. Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 357 (1964)
(“[T]he authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free
from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer
open to question.” (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491
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highways, airports, and other conduits through which interstate
commerce moves—as well as people traveling from one state to
another using TNC services—such regulations indisputably
impinge on Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.182
But as Gibbons instructed, it is within the powers reserved to the
states to regulate within their territory to improve the safety,
health, morals, and general welfare of their inhabitants.183 The
critical inquiry is thus whether certain TNC regulations run afoul
of the dormant Commerce Clause’s restriction prohibiting a state
from passing legislation that improperly burdens or discriminates
against interstate commerce.184 Given that courts have conferred
on individuals injured by state action that violates an aspect of
the Commerce Clause the right to sue and obtain injunctive and
declaratory relief, it is foreseeable that either TNCs or their users
may challenge TNC regulations on dormant Commerce Clause
grounds.185
B. Challenged TNC Regulations Will Likely be Evaluated Using
the Pike Balancing Test as Modified by Kassel
The safety of passengers and others on the road are the most
frequently cited concerns prompting the regulation of TNCs.186
(1917))); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (“Congress'
commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.” (citation omitted)).
182. See supra Part I (discussing the various state and local laws
promulgated to regulate TNC operations).
183. See Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59 (1915) (declaring that states’
police power “embraces regulations designed to promote public convenience or
the general prosperity or welfare, as well as those specifically intended to
promote the public safety or the public health”).
184. See supra Part IV (discussing the modern framework for analyzing
dormant Commerce Clause challenges); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137, 142 (establishing the modern interests-balancing approach).
185. See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443–45 (1991) (granting
individuals the right to sue for state violations of the Commerce Clause under
28 U.S.C. § 1983).
186. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 11 (noting that driver use of their phones
by way of these app-based softwares in the course of providing ride-for-hire
services is not only a violation of the California vehicle code laws, but also poses
great and sometimes deadly risk to those on the road); Lien & Mitchell, supra
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Although certain types of TNC regulations are seemingly
violative of the anti-discrimination principle, and thereby
presumptively invalid187—particularly those emblematic of
Washington, D.C.’s original “five times the taxi rate ”
proposal188—the majority of TNC regulations, like most
regulations of ride-for-hire services, may be characterized as
legitimate exercises of states’ police powers.189 Being enacted in
the interest of public health and safety—even if influenced by
industry competitors and advocacy groups seeking to veil
protectionist motivations190—these regulations will likely be
evaluated under the Pike balancing test as modified by Kassel
and afforded significant deference as a result.191 Taken together,
note 11 (citing the consumer protection lawsuit filed against Uber alleging that
this TNC has mislead consumers about the safety of its services and the fairness
of its rates).
187. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)
(invalidating a seemingly neutral law declared to be operating like a protective
tariff by depriving out-of-state competitors of the opportunity to undersell instate sellers). Though veiled discrimination may be difficult to prove, the Court
has struck down subtle protectionist measures through the use of “analogistic
reasoning,” declaring that “some laws . . . so closely parallel statutes that
concededly violate the Constitution that those laws are likewise subject to
judicial invalidation.” COENEN, supra note 55, at 232; see Baldwin, 294 U.S. at
527 (reasoning that because the state had “set up what is equivalent to a
rampart of customs duties,” the seemingly neutral law was deemed
impermissibly discriminatory and thus unconstitutional).
188. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (reporting on a proposed
Washington, D.C. TNC regulation that would have required Uber sedans to
charge a minimum of five times the “drop rate” for taxis in exchange for
approval to operate in the District).
189. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 442 (1978)
(noting that it is rarely disputed that states have a legitimate interest in
regulating motor vehicles using its roads in order to promote highway safety);
supra Part IV.C (discussing further the regulations promulgated to promote
public safety and their potential treatment under the Pike balancing test).
190. See Ammori supra note 5 (mentioning a FTC report finding that many
local taxi commissions colluded with and deliberately insulated taxi companies
from competition by restricting the number of available license).
191. See Chapin, supra note 89 and accompanying text (regulations enacted
pursuant to a legitimate exercise of state police powers will typically be
evaluated under the Pike balancing test); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137, 142 (1970) (stating that only regulations clearly excessive in relation to
their putative local benefits will be held unconstitutional if they regulate evenhandedly in pursuit of a legitimate local interest). But see supra note 187 and
accompanying text (noting that seemingly neutral laws may be found to operate
analogously to impermissibly discriminatory and unduly commerce-burdening
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Pike, Raymond, and Kassel indicate that the Court will evaluate
state laws regulating TNCs in the transportation context on a
case-by-case basis, “considering the specific evidence as to the
safety benefits of the laws compared to their burden on interstate
commerce.”192
C. Evaluations of Existing and Potentially Forthcoming TNC
Regulations
What follows below is an examination of archetypical TNC
regulations, analyzing both how they might be scrutinized and
their potential validity. Although TNCs were originally viewed
across the board by states as illegal taxicab operations, or in the
case of Uber “Black” as illegitimate charter party carriers, the
presently prevailing view is to characterize TNCs as “prearranged” transportation providers that require their own
classification.193 The consequences of this characterization are
that a state or local government’s regulation of TNCs should
naturally be viewed in comparison to their regulations of other
pre-arranged ride-for-hire providers.194
1. Licensing Fees; Vehicle Inspection and Background Check
Requirements; and Insurance Policy Requirements; Fare
Algorithm Standardization
regulations).
192. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 453; see supra Part V (discussing
the approach that the Court used to evaluate safety-oriented regulations in the
transportation context).
193. See Geron, supra note 3 (“The CPUC had previously issued cease and
desist rulings against Lyft, SideCar, and Uber, arguing that these companies
needed to be licensed, but then reached interim agreements with them to
operate.”). Ridesharing apps are increasingly coming to be viewed as “prearranged” transportation providers and therefore are not considered the same
as taxis. Id. Had ridesharing companies not come to be considered as prearranged transportation providers, they could be considered in the same
category as taxis and thus banned outright without dormant Commerce Clause
implications on the grounds that they were not complying with established taxi
regulations. Id.
194. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (requiring
even-handedness in the pursuit of legitimate local interests that incidentally
burden interstate commerce).
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State licensing and inspection requirements for businesses
are typically routine, innocuous, and presumptively permissible
exercises of state authority to regulate matters affecting
commerce.195 In Gibbons, the Court noted that states’ concurrent
power to enact laws that incidentally affect commerce included
the authority to promulgate “inspection laws” and others of this
sort.196 Alongside such indisputably permissible regulations are
requirements for pre-arranged ride-for-hire services to acquire
certain liability insurance policies as well as to have their
vehicles subject to inspection and their drivers subject to
background checks.197 Such consumer-protection and safetyoriented regulations have consistently evaded dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny because they are paradigmatic of
legitimate state interests in protecting the health and safety of
residents.198 The standardization of measurements for fare
calculation has also become accepted practice for protecting
consumers from shoddy business practices, particularly in the
context of taxi services.199 Absent showings that TNCs are being
discriminated against vis-à-vis other pre-arranged ride-for-hire
services—possible examples being arbitrary denials of licensure
applications or vastly disproportionate fees for license or
insurance requirements—such TNC regulations will easily
survive Pike balancing.200
195. See e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 61–62 (1824) (describing different,
and presumptively authorized types of commerce-burdening state regulations,
that states may enact).
196. Id. (“The State may lay duties on imports and exports, to execute its
inspection laws.”).
197. See Geron, supra note 3 (implying that TNCs’ praise for the landmark
operating agreement with the CPUC that imposed such conditions on providing
service are accepted as a legitimate and desirable legal norm).
198. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’n v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429,
434 (2005) (finding that Michigan's imposition of flat one hundred dollar annual
fee on trucks engaging in intrastate commercial hauling was a valid exercise of
the state’s police power, and did not violate dormant Commerce Clause).
199. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 532 (1949)
(noting that states have broad powers to protect inhabitants against perils to
health or safety, fraudulent traders and highway hazards, even by use of
measures which bear adversely upon interstate commerce).
200. See Am. Trucking Ass’n, 545 U.S. at 434 (concluding that an annual flat
licensing fee was a valid exercise of the state's police power and did not violate
dormant Commerce Clause).
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2. Mandatory Pricing Schedules and Airport Service Bans
Requirements for mandatory pricing schedules and steep
minimum charges for TNC services seem to be examples of
quintessentially discriminatory or unjustified regulation.201
Hailing from places like Miami and Washington, D.C., these
minimum fare requirements have the practical effect of making
TNC services cost-prohibitive for users. Although it is possible to
argue that this amounts to discrimination against out-of-state
TNCs—and thereby lend to the presumptive invalidity of such
regulations—state and local governments may be able to
demonstrate that these regulations are “even-handed” and apply
to in-state and out-of state actors alike.202 Given that these
regulations will likely not facially discriminate against TNCs in
particular and may be supported by various sorts of safety
justifications, they will likely be evaluated under the Pike—
Kassel interests-balancing test.203 Courts may come to scrutinize
such restrictions on service, particularly if the stated interests of
state regulators are to make TNC services more costly with no
reference to safety, as seemed to be the case in the Washington,
D.C. proposal.204 An examination of the reasons for a particular
numerical determination may also follow, investigating for
example, why regulators chose to set the minimum rate at fivetimes that of a taxi.205 This type of regulation seems to be
precisely the kind that would be subject to a rigorous and factintensive application of the Pike—Kassel test.206 If no strong
201. See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99
(1994) (finding that Oregon’s $2.25 per ton surcharge on disposal of out-of-state
waste is discriminatory on its face and violates the dormant Commerce Clause
in view of the $0.85 per ton charge imposed on solid in-state waste).
202. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
203. See id. (noting that nondiscriminatory safety-oriented regulations
treated under a deferential interests-balancing approach).
204. See Fallows, supra note 15 (reporting on a Washington, D.C., proposal
that would have allowed Uber to operate in the District in exchange for
implementing a mandatory surcharge of five-times the taxi base charge).
205. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981)
(scrutinizing numerical cut-offs in a truck-length limitation in finding it
violative of the dormancy principle).
206. See id. (evaluating a statute’s numerical limitation to determine
whether it was justified in light of the evidence, or lack thereof, of increased
safety).
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safety justifications exist to support high base charges for TNC
services and effectively regulate them out of existence in certain
jurisdictions, then courts may find such regulations excessively
burdensome on interstate commerce in relation to their “putative
local benefit.”207
Similarly, blanket airport bans restricting TNCs from
transporting interstate travelers may be constitutionally suspect
for lacking even-handedness.208 Given that other pre-arranged
ride-for-hire services are universally permitted to operate within
the jurisdiction of quasi-public airport authorities if they comport
with licensing and fee requirements, prohibiting outright the
possibility for TNCs to arrange service agreements akin to those
of other pre-arranged car-for-hire services, seems to amount to
impermissible protectionism and discrimination.209 Well-reasoned
safety justifications for such blanket bans likely exist, and may
lead courts to evaluate such bans under the modern interestsbalancing approach. Justifications for the bans may point to
rationales premised on limiting unsustainable levels of traffic at
airports or to cost-prohibitive logistical difficulties in ascertaining
when a driver has actually entered the airport’s jurisdiction and
how and whom to charge in such situations. Courts may look to
see if there are less burdensome alternatives to such commerceburdening blanket bans, searching to find if the allegedly
nondiscriminatory aims of these bans could not be achieved by
more carefully-tailored means.210 If the safety benefits of such
bans are “illusory” or solely that of marginally limiting airport
traffic by forcing people to avoid driving or flying in to or out of a
certain airport, then such bans may be held violative of the
dormancy principle under the Pike balancing approach.211
207. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
208. See id. at 142 (noting that such commerce-burdening regulation must
be even-handed and an appropriate measure in light of the nature of the harm
to be controlled for).
209. See supra Part IV.C.1 (discussing examples of analogous situations in
which a purportedly nondiscriminatory regulation could still be found to
discriminate).
210. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (“And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and
on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities.”).
211. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981).
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3. Driver Uniform and Car Insignia Requirements
Such regulations, long used in the taxi context, will feasibly
be introduced in the context of TNC regulation.212 It is not hard to
imagine the safety justifications for promulgating such
regulations for car-for-hire services, given that they quite
palpably serve to guard against consumer fraud while promoting
consumer safety.213 Challenges to such requirements will likely
be met with evaluation under the Pike—Kassel test.214 Though
typically afforded deference, it is conceivable that such safetyoriented regulations can result in overly burdensome demands on
TNCs and their drivers.215 An illustrative example would be a
requirement that drivers or cars in Virginia bear very
particularized insignia or logos on their person or vehicle to
identify themselves as TNC service providers.216 To further
promote consumer safety, a requirement that taxi-like plexi-glass
screens be installed in cars providing TNC services, despite
evidence showing that the safety gains are only marginal. It may
be the case, however, that the vast majority of surrounding
jurisdictions—such as Washington, D.C., West Virginia, and
North Carolina—require a completely different insignia and have
no requirement for a safety divider in the car. Such regulations,
though ostensibly promoting consumer safety despite, may be
found unduly burdensome on interstate commerce because their
practical effect would be to force drivers to either avoid entering
the state of Virginia while in the course of performing TNC
services or to buy all of the extra equipment to simply comply
212. See Geron, supra note 3 (indicating that the CPUC is mirroring TNC
regulations on existing regulatory frameworks, particularly those developed in
the taxi context).
213. See Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59 (1915) (noting that states’ police
powers are “designed to promote public convenience or the general prosperity or
welfare,
as
well
as . . . the public safety or the public health”).
214. See supra Part V (indicating that regulations aimed at consumer
protection and safety will be met with the modern interests-balancing test if
challenged).
215. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 671 (finding that the practical effects of this
regulation would be significantly burdensome for the trucking industry as a
whole).
216. See id. at 678 (drawing an exaggerated analogy to the challenged
regulations in Kassel).
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with the more restrictive law that would effectively change the
industry standard.217
VII. Conclusion
Acutely aware of the challenges to national economic unity
posed by various state highway regulations in the latter half of
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court was steadfast in
protecting the integrity of an unimpeded and cohesive interstate
highway system.218 Driven by similar concerns, courts today may
lend traction to dormant Commerce Clause challenges to TNC
regulations enacted in furtherance of public safety, particularly if
they are premised on illusory rationales or are poorly tailored to
this end.219
The viability of such challenges will depend on the
disposition of judges with respect to their views on the proper role
of the judiciary.220 Courts may be hesitant to overturn state and
local regulations of TNCs because of concerns about undermining
the Constitution’s carefully established structure for allocating
power between federal and state governments.221
217. See id. at 671 (indicating that regulations with extensive
extraterritorial and economic consequences for an industry will be scrutinized
closely).
218. See supra Part V (discussing the transportation cases wherein the
Supreme Court deemed regulations unduly burdening interstate commerce as
violative of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine).
219. See supra Part VI (arguing that certain TNC regulations may run afoul
of the dormant Commerce Clause’s restriction against unduly commerceburdening state regulations).
220. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing the belief of some
critics that the doctrine is baseless judicial activism that runs afoul of our
democratic constitutional theory).
221. Courts may be persuaded by the view of some critics that the dormant
Commerce Clause reverses the deliberate political inertia established by the
Constitution, and thereby lend little consideration to such challenges. See
Redish & Nugent, supra note 60, at 573
Under the dormant commerce clause, the federal judiciary—the organ
of the federal government most insulated from state influence and the
organ traditionally feared most by the states—makes the initial
legislative judgment whether state regulation of interstate commerce
is reasonable. If the Court strikes down economic regulations, the
states must somehow force Congress to reverse the decision of the
Court through legislation—a process made difficult because of
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Although it is within Congress’s power to preempt all
problematic commerce-burdening state and city statutes
regulating TNCs, such a move seems unlikely as the matter of
TNC regulation is typically viewed as a purely “local issue.”222
Alternatively, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could take
action to combat allegedly anticompetitive practices of local taxi
commissions or TNCs themselves as its power to regulate
interstate commerce is just as broad as Congress’s.223 It is
foreseeable that the FTC may become active in TNC regulation
for other reasons—specifically, by developing uniform regulations
concerning the privacy and data collection practices of TNCs.224
The dormant Commerce Clause may also prove to be a useful
tool in challenging regulations requiring TNCs to communicate
certain data or information on their webpages and applications to
consumers in particular jurisdictions.225 Because of the inevitable
extraterritorial reach of state regulations of Internet webpages,
they have time and again been held violative of the dormancy
principle.226 If the burdens posed by various webpage and app
design and data regulations become overly restrictive and

Congress’s inherent political inertia. Our historical and textual
analyses lead us to conclude that this is clearly not the plan of the
Constitution. State power to regulate interstate commerce was
designed to be determined solely by the political judgment of
Congress, where the states retain enough political power to block
congressional action, since Congress's inertia is not against them.
222. See Ammori, supra note 5 (arguing that the FTC has the authority and
legitimacy to regulate in this field).
223. See id. (noting that the FTC’s § 5 authority grants it jurisdiction to
regulate in this arena).
224. See Kurt Mueffelmann, Uber’s Privacy Woes Should Serve as a
Cautionary Tale for All Companies, WIRED (Jan. 23, 2015, 2:43 PM),
http://www.wired.com/2015/01/uber-privacy-woes-cautionary-tale/ (last visited
Feb. 4, 2015) (“In fact, the FTC used this power to go after Google and Facebook
in 2011 for abusing customer information without prior disclosure of these
practices to consumers.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
225. See Michelle Armond, Note, State Internet Regulation and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 379, 379–80 (2002) (noting that
dormant Commerce Clause may pose as a strong tool for challenges to Internet
regulations).
226. See id. (citing recent prominent cases where internet regulations were
invalidated under the dormant Commerce Clause).
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unmanageable for TNCs, then they may possibly utilize the
dormant Commerce Clause to challenge them.227
This Note does not aim to argue that any and all safety
concerns offered in efforts to regulate or limit TNC operations are
unfounded or that invalidation of well-intentioned attempts to
regulate for these concerns on dormant Commerce Clause
grounds will somehow take care of them. Genuine safety concerns
do exist, and the only way to seriously deal with them is to allay
them through even-handed and constitutional legislation that
recognizes that TNCs are here to stay, rather than turning a
blind eye to them or trying to regulate them out of existence. This
Note maintains that a critical step in achieving a greater balance
among the wants of consumers, TNCs, and regulators is crafting
legislation that is both thoughtful and constitutional, to which
end the potential pitfalls of certain current regulatory schemes
are illuminated.
Unless and until there is federal regulation of TNCs, this
Note concludes that many state regulations currently on the
books are constitutionally problematic, with surely many more to
come.228 In efforts to avoid running afoul of the dormant
Commerce Clause, state and local governments may unwittingly
realize the benefits and potential that these and other emerging
app-based technologies have to offer.229

227. See id. at 385–90 (discussing cases where Internet content providers
successfully challenged the extraterritorial reach of internet regulations by
invoking the dormant Commerce Clause).
228. See Kellie Mejdrich, Airports Speed Up Plans to Regulate Ride-Sharing
Apps Like UberX, Lyft, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Jan. 11, 2015),
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/airport-647771-companies-state.html
(last
visited on Jan 11, 2015) (pointing out that “the struggle to regulate these
companies at airports highlights a larger issue: a continually transforming
transportation landscape,” as there are more such services coming online every
day).
229. See supra Part I (noting various quality of life improvements resulting
from TNC operations, including the promotion of a sustainable and
environmentally conscious transportation infrastructure).

